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Abstract
We analyse the effect of taxation in the online sport betting market.
This market is characterized by its negligible marginal costs. Taxation
can be on volume (General Betting Duty) or on gross profit (Gross
Profit Tax). We model the two most popular online sport betting
bets: fixed-odds and spread, as compared with another traditional
sport betting: parimutuel.
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1 Introduction
Over the last years, many European countries have been regulating their
online betting and gaming sector. However, this regulation has not been
∗Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Economı´a y Competitividad
(ECO2014-52616-R) is gratefully acknowledged.
†E-mail: vidalpuga@uvigo.es. Address: Facultade de Ciencias Sociais. Campus A Xun-
queira. 36005 Pontevedra. Spain.
1
done in a uniform way throughout the different countries.
In general, the basic taxation scheme is based on two types of taxes:
the General Betting Duty (GBD) is levied as a proportion of betting stakes;
whereas the Gross Profits Tax (GPT) is levied as a proportion of the net
revenue of the operators.
Some examples: the United Kingdom applied a 6.75% tax on GBD until
October 2001, when it was replaced by a 15% tax in GPT (National Audit
Office, 2005). Italy applies a 2%-5% tax on GBD (Ficom Leisure, 2011)
for general sport betting and a 20% tax on GPT for spread bets (PwC,
2011). France applies a 8.5% tax on GBD (Global Betting and Gaming
Consultancy, 2011) since 2010. In Germany, tax rates largely depend on
the respective federal state, and they vary between 20% and 80% on GPT
plus a 5% federal tax on GBD (Hofmann and Spitz, 2015). In 2011, Spanish
authorities approved a law1 that applies a 25% tax on GPT for some types
of bets and a 15-22% tax on GBD for others, plus a 0.1% tax on GBD. In
the next table we summarize the data:
GBD GPT
UK 6.75% (until 2001) 15% (since 2001)
Italy 2-5% (general) 20% (spread)
France 8.5% -
Germany 5% 20-80%
Spain 25% (parimutuel)+0.1% (all) 15-22% (general)
In the Spanish case, GBD has been the taxation scheme in the most tradi-
tional oﬄine sport betting (la quiniela), which takes a parimutuel structure.
In a parimutuel market, a winning bet pays off a proportional share of
the total stake on all outcomes. However, the most popular online sport
operators are specialized in another two markets: Fixed-odds and spread. In
a fixed-odd market, the operator sets the odds for each possible outcome of
1Ley 13/2011, de 27 de mayo, de regulacio´n del juego (in Spanish). Bolet´ın Oficial
del Estado 127(I), 52976-53022. Available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/05/
28/pdfs/BOE-A/2011/9280.pdf
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the match, and the bettors decide whether they accept or not these odds.
In a spread market, the operator acts as an intermediator among the users,
whom bargain the odds.
For sport matches, a bet of 1 monetary unit on a particular team yields a
return of 1
pi
monetary units in case the team wins the match, and 0 otherwise.
In this context, an odd pi ∈ (0, 1) is defined as the probability assigned by
the market. Notice that any risk-neutral bettor would find it profitable to
bet at odd pi when her private probability estimation is higher than pi.
In parimutuel and spread bets, the operator’s profit comes from a commis-
sion on either the amount at risk or the winning amount (typically around 5%
in online spread operators). In fixed-odds bets, the operator’s profit comes
from the odds, which should sum up more than 100%2 for all the possible
outcomes of the sport match3.
In this paper, we model the three types of market in a general setting. The
regulator decides on the general taxing scheme (either GBD or GPT) and the
operators decide on their commission (parimutuel and spread operators) or
odds (fixed-odds operators). We assume that the spread betting commission
is applied to the winning bets (as it is typical in online spread operators),
whereas commission in parimutuel betting applies to the total amount (as in
the Spanish regulation).
We show that, from the online bettor’s point of view, it is preferable a
GPT scheme, in the following sense: In equilibrium, the odds are not affected
by the taxation under GPT; whereas a GBD scheme would reduce the odds
and hence the bettors’ utility. As opposed, in the parimutuel market GPT
and GBD provide the same effect.
These results agree with the ones presented by Smith (2000) and Paton
et al. (2002, 2001), whom analyse the effect of the different taxation schemes
2In case the odds summed up less than 100%, it would be possible, by betting an
appropriate amount of money on each possible match outcome, to win a positive amount
irrespectively of the final match outcome.
3The sum of the odds, called overround, provides a way to measure the operator ad-
vantage.
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in Australian, UK and USA betting markets. These results, however, are
more focused on oﬄine betting operators and government revenue. Moreover,
they take into account the marginal cost of each bet. As opposed, we assume
that these marginal costs are negligible.
There are other works that focus on parimutuel markets: Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2009) provide a model that explains the empirical evidence of un-
derdogs overbet. These authors argue that this bias may be due to privately
informed bettors. As opposed, we prove (Corollary 3.1) that the spread bet
operator would get a higher profit if the underdog wins the game.
Other works concentrate on fixed-odd markets. For example, Bag and
Saha (2011, 2016) study the externalities due to bribery in sports; and Levitt
(2004) argues that the operators may achieve higher profits by an accurate
prediction of the match outcome.
As far as we know, no similar research has been addressed for spread
markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the
model. In Section 3, we study the equilibrium payoffs in each of the three
markets and provide the main results. In Section 4, we briefly compare the
payoffs in the different markets. In Section 5, we present some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
Two teams (home and away) play a competitive sport match; the match
being drawn is not a possibility.
There are three types of agents in the model: A continuum set B of bettors
are interested in betting, but only if the odds are attractive; a bookmaker that
offers bets; and a regulator (Government) that decides on taxes.
We assume that bettors are risk neutral and try to maximize their ex-
pected profit. Each bettor i ∈ B is characterized by her individual belief (i.e.
the probability) xi that the home team wins (1 − xi is the probability that
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the away team wins); xi is distributed following an absolutely continuous cdf
with probability density function f and full support over (0, 1).
The bookmaker, on the other side, also wants to maximize her own profit
but she does not have any belief on the true probability for the home team to
win. Hence, it is not possible to estimate an expected profit for her. Instead,
we assume that the bookmaker tries to maximize her monetary profit under
the worst possible outcome of the match.
There are three possible types of bookmakers: Fixed-odd bookmakers,
spread bookmakers and parimutuel bookmakers. Fixed-odd bookmakers de-
cide odds piH , piA ∈ [0, 1] such that any bettor that bets on the home (away)
team receives 1
piH
− 1 ( 1
piA
− 1) in case of home (away) win, and −1 in case of
away (home) win. Spread bookmakers decide a commission c on the profit of
any winning bettor. Parimutuel bookmakers decide a commission c on the
stake of any bettor.
3 The non-cooperative game
The study the effect of taxation in the online market. Assume the regulator
announces a tax, that could be a percentage υ on volume (GBD), a percent-
age ρ on gross profit (GPT), or both. The non-cooperative game has two
steps:
Step 1 The bookmaker observes υ and ρ and announces her odds (fixed-odds)
or commission (spread/parimutuel). Let sk denote this choice.
Step 2 Each bettor i ∈ B observes sk, and choose to participate or not. Let
si(sk) denote this choice.
Following Neyman (2002), we assume that, for any bettors’ strategy pro-
file, the set C of bettors that give any particular signal is always Borel-
medible4, and we denote its volume as ‖C‖.
4This is done in order to avoid meaningless strategies such as, for example, to bet iff
xi is a rational number.
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Given an admissible strategy profile s = (sk, (si(·))i∈B), we denote as
u(s) ∈ R{k}∪B, or simply u, the final payoff allocation of the noncooperative
game.
We will work with the standard concept of subgame perfect equilibrium
and a natural extension of it, named strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
Notice that the only proper subgames arise in Step 2..
Definition 3.1 A strategy profile s = (sk, (si(·))i∈B) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if two conditions hold:
1. For each i ∈ B, each bookmaker’s strategy s˜k and all bettor i’s strategy
s˜i(·),
ui
(
s˜k, (sj (s˜k))j∈B\{i} , s˜i (s˜k)
)
≤ ui
(
s˜k, (sj (s˜k))j∈B
)
.
2. For all bookmaker’s strategy s˜k,
uk
(
s˜k, (si (s˜k))i∈B
) ≤ uk (sk, (si (sk))i∈B) .
Definition 3.2 A strategy profile s = (sk, (si(·))i∈B) is a strong subgame
perfect equilibrium if two conditions hold:
1. For each C ⊂ B, all bookmaker’s strategy s˜k and all strategy profile
(s˜i(·))i∈C,
ui
(
s˜k, (sj (s˜k))j∈B\C , (sj (s˜k))j∈C
)
≤ ui
(
s˜k, (sj (s˜k))j∈B
)
for all i ∈ C.
2. For all bookmaker’s strategy s˜k,
uk
(
s˜k, (si (s˜k))i∈B
) ≤ uk (sk, (si (sk))i∈B) .
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3.1 Fixed-odds bookmakers
In the fixed-odd case, the bookmaker chooses odds piH and piA, i.e. sk =
(piH , piA) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Each bettor i ∈ B observes the odds and chooses
si(piH , piA) ∈ {D,H,A} with the following interpretation:
• If si(piH , piA) = D, bettor i declines to bet (abstains) and her final
payoff is zero.
• If si(piH , piA) = H, bettor i bets for the home team at odd piH and her
final payoff is
ui =
(
1
piH
− 1
)
xi + (−1) (1− xi) .
• If si(piH , piA) = A, bettor i bets for the away team at odd piA and her
final payoff is
ui = (−1)xi +
(
1
piA
− 1
)
(1− xi) .
Let BH = {i ∈ B : si(piH , piA) = H} and BA = {i ∈ B : si(piH , piA) = A},
and let h = ||BH || and a = ||BA|| be their respective volumes. Then, the
bookmaker’s final payoff is
uk = (1− ρ) min
{
(1− υ) (h+ a)− 1
piH
h, (1− υ) (h+ a)− 1
piA
a
}
= (1− ρ)
(
(1− υ) (h+ a)−max
{
1
piH
h,
1
piA
a
})
.
The next result characterizes the (strong) subgame perfect equilibrium in
the fixed-odds case:
Theorem 3.1 Given υ and ρ, there exists a (strong) subgame perfect equi-
librium in the fixed-odds noncooperative game. Moreover, the odds in equi-
librium are characterized by the maximization problem
max (1− ρ)
{
(1− υ)
[∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt+
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt
]
− 1
piH
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt
}
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subject to
1
piH
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt =
1
piA
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt (1)
piH , piA ∈ [0, 1] , piH + piA ≥ 1.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. ‖B‖ = 1. In Step 2 of the game, it is optimal for any
bettor i ∈ B with xi > piH to announce si(piH , piA) = H. Analogously, it is
optimal for any bettor i ∈ Bk with 1− xi > piA to announce si(piH , piA) = A.
Hence, h =
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt and a =
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt. Equality (1) comes from
the fact that the bookmaker wants to minimize max
{
1
piH
h, 1
piA
a
}
, that is the
maximum bettors’ winnings when either the home team ( 1
piH
h) or the away
team ( 1
piA
a) wins. Hence, in equilibrium both amounts should be equal. For
a fixed piA, there exists a unique piH that satisfies (1). To see why, notice
that φ (pi) = 1
pi
∫ 1
pi
f (t) dt is a strictly decreasing function on pi ∈ (0, 1) with
φ (0+) = +∞ and φ (1−) = 0+, whereas ψ (pi) = 1
1−pi
∫ pi
0
f (t) dt is a strictly
increasing function on pi ∈ (0, 1) with ψ (0+) = 0+ and ψ (1−) = +∞. Hence,
for each piH , there exists a unique piA with φ (piH) = ψ (1− piA). Moreover,
the largest piH is, the largest piA is. Let ΠA : (0, 1) → (0, 1) be the function
that assigns to each piH its corresponding piA. This function is well-defined,
strictly increasing, and it satisfies ΠA (0
+) = 0+ and ΠA (1
−) = 1−. Notice
that the bet volume is given by h+ a. Since tax v applies on volume, and ρ
applies on profit, the bookmaker would maximize
(1− ρ)
{
(1− υ) (h+ a)− 1
piH
h
}
which is the desired maximizing function. Furthermore, it is straightforward
to check that there exists at least one maximizing piH ∈ (0, 1).
From the previous result, we see that the bookmaker looks to balance the
positive effect of a large volume (given by
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt+
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt) against
the negative effect of a big prize (given by 1
piH
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt = 1
piA
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt).
A large volume is obtained by setting low piH (and hence low piA). A low
prize is obtained by setting high piH (and hence high piA).
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The effect of ρ (tax on profit) is irrelevant for the maximization problem.
Hence, the optimal piH and piA are independent of the chosen ρ. A different
issue happens with υ, which gives less weight to the positive effect of a large
volume. This suggests that the bookmaker would set a high piH (and high
piA), which means that the utility of the bettors is reduced.
3.2 Spread bookmakers
In the spread case, the bookmaker chooses commission c ∈ (0, 1), i.e. sk =
c ∈ (0, 1). Each bettor i ∈ B observes c and chooses si(c) ∈ {D} ∪ {H,A} ×
(0, 1) with the following interpretation:
• If si(c) = D, bettor i declines to bet and her final utility is zero.
• If si(c) = (H, piH), bettor i declares that she wants to bet for the home
team at odd at most piH .
• If si(c) = (A, piA), bettor i declares that she wants to bet for the away
team at odd at most piA.
The bookmaker matches (H, piH)-bettors with (A, piA)-bettors that satisfy
piH ≥ 1−piA with odds pi, 1−pi such that: pi ≤ piH and 1−pi ≤ piA. The match-
ing is done in such a way that each pi volume of (H, piH)-bettors is matched
with a 1 − pi volume of (A, piA)-bettors. The reason is that, in case home
team wins, a 1 − pi volume of money is transferred from (A, piA)-bettors to
(H, piH)-bettors, so that each (H, piH)-bettor receives a gross winning (profit
+ bet):
1− pi
pi
+ 1 =
1
pi
≥ 1
piH
hence granting their request to bet for the home team at odd at least piH .
Analogously, in case away team wins, a pi volume of money is transferred
from (H, piH)-bettors to (A, piA)-bettors, so that each (A, piA)-bettor receives
a gross winning (profit + bet):
pi
1− pi + 1 =
1
1− pi ≥
1
piA
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hence granting their request to bet for the away team at odd at least piA.
Hence, pi is chosen so that
(1− pi) ‖BH ∪ B′H‖ ≥ pi ‖BA‖
pi ‖BA ∪ B′A‖ ≥ (1− pi) ‖BH‖
where
BH = {i ∈ B : si = (H, piH) , piH > pi}
B′H = {i ∈ B : si = (H, pi)}
BA = {i ∈ B : si = (A, piA) , piA > 1− pi}
B′A = {i ∈ B : si = (A, pi)} .
If si = (H, piH) with piH > pi, bettor i bets for the home team at odd pi
and her final payoff is
ui = (1− c)
(
1
pi
− 1
)
xi + (−1) (1− xi) . (2)
If si = (A, piA) with piA > 1 − pi, bettor i bets for the away team at odd
1− pi and her final payoff is
ui = (−1)xi + (1− c)
(
1
1− pi − 1
)
(1− xi) . (3)
If si = D, or si = (H, piH) with piH < pi, or si = (A, piA) with piA < 1− pi,
bettor i does not bet and her final payoff is zero.
When si = (H, pi) or si = (A, 1− pi), we have two cases:
Case 1:
‖BH∪B′H‖
pi
≤ ‖BA∪B
′
A‖
1−pi . If si = (H, pi), then bettor i bets for the
home team and her final payoff is (2). If si = (A, 1− pi), then bettor i bets
for the away team with probability pA =
1−pi
pi
‖BH∪B′H‖
‖B′A‖ −
‖BA‖
‖B′A‖ and her final
payoff is
ui =
[
(−1)xi + (1− c)
(
1
1− pi − 1
)
(1− xi)
]
pA.
Case 2:
‖BH∪B′H‖
pi
≥ ‖BA∪B
′
A‖
1−pi . If si = (A, 1− pi), then bettor i bets for
the away team and her final payoff is (3). If si = (H, pi), then bettor i bets
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for the home team with probability pH =
pi
1−pi
‖BA∪B′A‖
‖B′H‖ −
‖BH‖
‖B′H‖ and her final
payoff is
ui =
[
(1− c)
(
1
pi
− 1
)
xi + (−1) (1− xi)
]
pH .
We describe this protocol in the following example:
Example 3.1 Assume ‖B‖ = 1 and the bets are D, (H, 0.4), (H, 0.6),
(H, 0.8), (A, 0.2), (A, 0.4), and (A, 0.6) with volumes 0.2, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1,
0.1, and 0.1, respectively, as shown in the first two columns of the following
table:
Bet Volume Matched
D 0.2 No (abstain)
(H, 0.4) 0.1 No
(H, 0.6) 0.3 67%
(H, 0.8) 0.1 100%
(A, 0.2) 0.1 No
(A, 0.4) 0.1 100%
(A, 0.6) 0.1 100%
Total 1 50%
Under these bets, pi = 0.6 clears the market, so that the ratio of H-bettors
to A-bettors should be 0.6
1−0.6 =
3
2
. Moreover, ‖BH‖ = 0.1, ‖B′H‖ = 0.3,
‖BA‖ = 0.1, and ‖B′A‖ = 0.1. Since ‖
BH∪B′H‖
pi
= 0.4
0.6
> 0.2
0.4
=
‖BA∪B′A‖
1−pi , we are
in Case 2 and there exists an excess of H-bettors that will not be matched. In
particular, the whole 0.1 volume of (H, 0.8)-bettors matches a 0.2
3
volume of
(A, 0.6)-bettors; a 0.05 volume of (H, 0.6)-bettors matches the remaining 0.1
3
volume of (A, 0.6)-bettors; finally, a 0.15 volume of (H, 0.6)-bettors matches
the remaining 0.1 volume of (A, 0.4)-bettors. The remaining 0.1 volume of
(H, 0.6)-bettors, the 0.1 volume of (A, 0.2)-bettors, and the 0.1 volume of
(H, 0.4)-bettors remain unmatched.
We now compute the bookmaker’s payoff. Analogously to the previous
subsection, we denote h = ‖BH‖, h′ = ‖B′H‖, a = ‖BA‖, and a′ = ‖B′A‖.
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Now, in case the home team wins, the monetary transfer from A-bettors to
H-bettors is
α =
(
1
pi
− 1
)
(h+ min {1, pH}h′)
=
1− pi
pi
min {h+ h′, h+ pHh′}
= min
{
1− pi
pi
(h+ h′), a+ a′
}
.
Analogously, in case the away team wins, the monetary transfer from
H-bettors to A-bettors is
β = min
{
pi
1− pi (a+ a
′), h+ h′
}
.
Then, the total volume is α+β and the final payoff for the bookmaker is
uk = (1− ρ) (cmin{α, β} − (α + β)υ) .
The next result characterizes the (strong) subgame perfect equilibria in
the spread bets case:
Theorem 3.2 Given υ and ρ, there exists a (strong) subgame perfect equi-
librium with undominated strategies5 in the spread bets noncooperative game.
Moreover, the commission and odds in equilibrium are characterized by the
maximization problem
max
c∈[0,1]
(1− ρ) (cmin{1− pi, pi} − υ) γ
subject to
γ =
1
pi
∫ 1
pi
1−(1−pi)c
f (t) dt =
1
1− pi
∫ (1−c)pi
1−pic
0
f (t) dt (4)
pi, c ∈ [0, 1] .
5Undominated strategies are required in order to avoid meaningless equilibria of the
form “everybody chooses D”.
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Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. ‖B‖ = 1. In Step 2 of the game, it is optimal for
any bettor i ∈ B to bet for the home team at odds pi when pi is such that
(1− c)
(
1
pi
− 1
)
xi + (−1) (1− xi) > 0
which is equivalent to:
xi >
pi
1− (1− pi) c.
Analogously, it is optimal for any bettor i ∈ B to bet for the away team at
odd 1− pi when pi is such that
(−1)xi + (1− c)
(
1
1− pi − 1
)
(1− xi) > 0
which is equivalent to:
xi <
(1− c) pi
1− pic .
Then, the unique odd pic that clears the market is characterized as in (4) by
γc =
1
pic
∫ 1
pic
1−(1−pic)c
f (t) dt =
1
1− pic
∫ (1−c)pic
1−cpic
0
f (t) dt. (5)
To see that pic exists and it is unique, let φ, ψ : (0, 1) −→ R be two func-
tions defined as φ(pi) = 1
pi
∫ 1
pi
1−(1−pi)c
f (t) dt and ψ(pi) = 1
1−pi
∫ (1−c)pi
1−cpi
0 f (t) dt
for all pi ∈ (0, 1), respectively. It is clear that φ is strictly decreasing with
φ(0+) =∞ and φ(1−) = 0+, and that ψ is strictly increasing with ψ(0+) = 0+
and ψ(1−) = ∞. Hence, there exists a unique pic satisfying φ(pic) = ψ(pic).
Moreover, a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy with undominated strate-
gies is characterized as follows:
• Each bettor i ∈ B with xi > pic1−(1−pic)c chooses si(c) = (H, pic).
• Each bettor i ∈ B with xi < pic(1−c)1−cpic chooses si(c) = (A, 1− pic).
• Any other bettor i ∈ B chooses si(c) = D.
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This strategy profile induces pi = pic, and it is a strong equilibrium because
no set of bettors can modify pi in its own benefit, and any other equilibria
will also satisfy pi = pic. In general,
BH ∪ B′H = B′A =
{
i ∈ B : xi ≥ pi
c
1− c (1− pic)
}
(6)
BA ∪ B′A = B′A =
{
i ∈ B : xi ≤ pi
c (1− c)
1− cpic
}
(7)
h+ h′
a+ a′
=
h′
a′
=
pic
1− pic . (8)
The (strong) subgame perfect equilibrium is then completely characterized
in Step 1 by the maximization of the bookmaker’s payoff:
max
c∈[0,1]
(1− ρ) (cmin{α, β} − (α + β)υ)
where
α = min
{
1− pic
pic
(h+ h′) , a+ a′
}
(8)
=
1− pic
pic
(h+ h′)
(6)
=
1− pic
pic
∫ 1
pic
1−(1−pic)c
f(t)dt
(5)
= (1− pic)γc.
Analogously,
β
(8)(7)
=
pic
1− pic
∫ pic(1−c)
1−cpic
0
f(t)dt
(5)
= picγc
from where the maximization problem becomes
max
c∈[0,1]
(1− ρ) (cmin{1− pic, pic} − υ) γc.
As c increases, the percentage of winners profits increase too, but this
winner profit decreases because less bettors participate. Hence, the book-
maker looks to balance the positive effect of a big commission (hence big
percentage of winnings) against the negative effect on the winnings (which
decreases with c).
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Like fixed-odds bookmakers, the effect of ρ (tax on profit) is irrelevant
for the maximization problem. Hence, the optimal c is independent of the
chosen ρ. Again, a different issue happens with υ, which penalizes the effect
of a large volume. Hence, like fixed-odds, the bookmaker would set a higher
c, which means that the utility of the bettors is reduced.
As opposed to fixed-odds, the spread bookmaker is not indifferent to
which team will win the match. In fact, the bookmaker would always prefer
the underdog (non-favorite) to win the match, as next result shows:
Corollary 3.1 Let pi, 1 − pi be the odds in equilibrium. If pi > 1
2
, then the
bookmaker’s payoff is bigger when the away team wins. If pi < 1
2
, then the
bookmaker’s payoff is bigger when the home team wins. If pi = 1
2
, then the
spread bookmaker’s payoff is independent of which team wins.
Proof. From Theorem 3.2, h =
∫ 1
pi
1−c(1−pi)
f (t) dt is the volume of bettors that
bet for the home team, whereas a =
∫ pi(1−c)
1−cpi
0 f (t) dt is the volume of bettors
that bet for the away team. When the home team wins, the gross profit of
the bookmaker is
(
1
pi
− 1) ch. When the away team wins, the gross profit
of the bookmaker is
(
1
1−pi − 1
)
ca. Moreover, we have 1
pi
h = 1
1−pia. Hence,
the bookmakers prefers the home (away) team to win when h < a (h > a).
Equivalently, the bookmaker prefers the home (away) team to win when
h
a
< 1 (h
a
> 1). Since h
a
= pi
1−pi , it only happens when
pi
1−pi < 1 (
pi
1−pi > 1), i.e.
pi < 1
2
(pi > 1
2
). The result for pi = 1
2
is straightforward.
3.3 Parimutuel bookmakers
In the parimutuel case, the bookmaker chooses commission c ∈ (0, 1), i.e.
sk = c ∈ (0, 1). Each bettor i ∈ B observes c and (simultaneously) chooses
si(c) ∈ {D,H,A} with the following interpretation. Let BH = {i ∈ B : si = H}
and BA = {i ∈ B : si = A}:
• If si(c) = D, bettor i declines to bet and her final payoff is zero.
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• If si(c) = H, bettor i declares that she wants to bet for the home team.
Her final payoff is:
ui =
‖BH ∪ BA‖
‖BH‖ (1− c)xi − 1.
• If si(c) = A, bettor i declares that she wants to bet for the away team.
Her final payoff is:
ui =
‖BH ∪ BA‖
‖BA‖ (1− c) (1− xi)− 1.
The bookmaker’s final payoff is
uk = (1− ρ) (1− υ) ‖BH ∪ BA‖ c.
The next result characterizes the (strong) subgame perfect equilibria in
the parimutuel case:
Theorem 3.3 Given υ and ρ, there exists a (strong) subgame perfect equi-
librium, where each bettor i bets for the home team if xi > piH and for the
away team if xi < piA for some thresholds piH , piA ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the com-
mission and thresholds in equilibrium are characterized by the maximization
problem
max
c∈[0, 12 ]
(1− ρ) (1− υ)
[∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt+
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt
]
c
subject to
1
piH
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt =
1
piA
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt (9)
piA + piB =
1
1− c
piA, piB ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. In Step 2, an equilibrium profile s is characterized by ui ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ B. That is:
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• si(c) = H iff ‖BH∪BA‖‖BH‖ (1− c)xi ≥ 1. Analogously, i ∈ BH iff xi ≥
1
(1−c)
‖BH‖
‖BH∪BA‖ , which implies that piH =
1
(1−c)
‖BH‖
‖BH∪BA‖ satisfies BH =
{i ∈ B : xi ∈ [piH , 1]}.
• si(c) = A iff ‖BH∪BA‖‖BA‖ (1− c) (1− xi) ≥ 1. Analogously, i ∈ BA iff
xi ≤ 1 − 1(1−c) ‖BA‖‖BH∪BA‖ , which implies that piA = 1(1−c)
‖BA‖
‖BH∪BA‖ satisfies
BA = {i ∈ B : xi ∈ [0, 1− piA]}.
Moreover, piH + piA =
1
1−c . Hence, these piH and piA are characterized by:
piH
∫ 1−piA
0
f(t)dt = piA
∫ 1
piH
f(t)dt
piH + piA =
1
1− c
which implies
1
piA
∫ 1−piA
0
f (t) dt =
1
piH
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt.
These conditions also characterize the strong equilibrium, because no subset
of bettors can get advantage by changing their bets. In order to prove ex-
istence of piH and piA, note first that these conditions are not possible when
c > 1
2
. In that case, the only equilibrium is achieved with si = D for all
i ∈ B, which gives the bookmaker a payoff of zero. In case c = 1
2
, the unique
solution is piH = piA = 1, which again gives the bookmaker a payoff of zero.
Assume then c < 1
2
, and let d = 1
1−c ∈ (1, 2). We define φ : (d−1, 1) −→ R as
φ(pi) = 1
pi
∫ 1−pi
0
f(t)dt− 1
d−pi
∫ 1
d−pi f(t)dt. It is straightforward to check that φ
is continuous, strictly decreasing, and satisfies φ(1−d−) > 0, and φ(1−) < 0.
Hence, there exists a unique pi = piA such that φ(pi) = 0 and, moreover, the
bookmaker gets a positive payoff.
A straightforward corollary is the following:
Corollary 3.2 Assume there exists a unique (strong) subgame perfect equi-
librium. Then, taxes on volume (υ) and on profit (ρ) are equivalent; both
decrease bookmaker’s utility, but maintains the commission and the volume.
Bettors utility remains unchanged.
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4 Type comparison in the symmetric case
Given the results in the previous section, a natural question is whether a
monopolistic bookmaker would prefer to offer fixed-odds, spread bets, or
parimutuel. We address this question in the symmetric case, i.e. when f is
symmetric:
f(x) = f(1− x)
for all x ∈ (0, 1).
This case covers situations where there is no favourite team in the sport
match, or when there exists a favourite but it has a handicap that makes the
match even. Such handicap bets are quite common in online betting, and
allow the bookmakers to assure that the volume of bets between home and
away teams are balanced. In our model, this is particularly relevant for the
spread bets bookmaker, since it makes her indifferent of who is the winning
team (Corollary 3.1).
The main result of this section characterizes the equilibrium payoffs and
states that fixed odds and spread bets are equivalent in the symmetric case:
Theorem 4.1 Assume f(x) = f(1− x) for all x ∈ (0, 1). Then:
a) Fixed-odds and spread bets yield the same payoff allocation in equilib-
rium. The odds and the bookmaker’s payoff are given by
max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ)
(
2(1− υ)− 1
pi
)∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt.
b) The odds and the bookmaker’s payoff in the parimutuel case are given
by
max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ) (1− υ)
(
2− 1
pi
)∫ 1
pi
f (t) dt.
Proof. a) We focus first on the fixed-odds case characterized in Theorem
3.1. Under symmetry, (1) becomes
1
piH
∫ 1
piH
f (t) dt =
1
piA
∫ 1
piA
f (t) dt.
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This equality holds when piA = piB. Since F (x) =
1
x
∫ 1
x
f (t) dt is a strictly
decreasing function, we deduce that, for each piA, there exists a unique piH
that satisfies F (piH) = F (piA). Hence, (1) is equivalent to piA = piB. The
other restrictions are piA, piB ∈ [0, 1] and piA + piB ≥ 1, which become piH =
piA ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. The maximization problem given in Theorem 3.1 becomes
max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ)
{
(1− υ)
[∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt+
∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt
]
− 1
pi
∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt
}
= max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ)
(
2(1− υ)− 1
pi
)∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt.
We now focus on the spread bets characterized in Theorem 3.2. Under sym-
metry, (4) becomes
1
pi
∫ 1
pi
1−(1−pi)c
f (t) dt =
1
1− pi
∫ 1
1− (1−c)pi
1−pic
f (t) dt
equivalently,
1
pi
∫ 1
pi
1−(1−pi)c
f (t) dt =
1
1− pi
∫ 1
1−pi
1−pic
f (t) dt
or
G(pi) = G(1− pi)
where G(x) = 1
x
∫ 1
x
1−(1−x)c
f (t) dt. This equality holds when pi = 1
2
. It is
straightforward to check that G is a strictly decreasing function on [0, 1], and
so pi = 1
2
is the only solution to G(pi) = G(1−pi). Hence, (4) is equivalent to
pi = 1
2
and γ = 2
∫ 1
1
2−c
f(t)dt. The maximization problem given in Theorem
3.2 becomes
max
c∈[0,1]
(1− ρ)
(
cmin
{
1− 1
2
,
1
2
}
− υ
)
γ
= max
c∈[0,1]
(1− ρ)
( c
2
− υ
)
γ
= max
c∈[0,1]
(1− ρ)
( c
2
− υ
)
2
∫ 1
1
2−c
f(t)dt.
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We now proceed by a change of variable: pi = 1
2−c , so that c ∈ [0, 1] is
equivalent to pi ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
and the maximization problem becomes
max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ)
(
2− 1
pi
2
− υ
)
2
∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt
= max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ)
(
2(1− υ)− 1
pi
)∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt.
b) In the parimutuel case, we apply Theorem 3.3. Since (1) is equivalent
to (9), we follow the same reasoning as before to deduce that piH = piA.
The other restriction is piH + piA =
1
1−c . Hence, piH = piA =
1
2(1−c) and the
maximization problem becomes
max
c∈[0, 12 ]
(1− ρ) (1− υ) 2c
∫ 1
1
2(1−c)
f (t) dt.
We now proceed by a change of variable: pi = 1
2(1−c) , so that c ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
is
equivalent to pi ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
and the maximization problem becomes
max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ) (1− υ)
(
2− 1
pi
)∫ 1
pi
f (t) dt.
We can now answer the question of which type of bets a monopolistic
bookmaker would prefer to offer. If there is no tax on volume, she would be
indifferent. When there is a tax on volume, she would prefer parimutuel:
Corollary 4.1 Assume f(x) = f(1− x) for all x ∈ (0, 1). Then:
a) When there is no tax on volume (υ = 0), fixed-odds, spread bets and
parimutuel yield the same payoff allocation in equilibrium. The odds
and the bookmaker’s payoff are given by
max
pi∈[ 12 ,1]
(1− ρ)
(
2− 1
pi
)∫ 1
pi
f(t)dt.
b) When there is a tax on volume (υ > 0), parimutuel gives in equilibrium
a higher payoff to the bookmaker than fixed-odds and spread bets.
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Proof. a) It follows from setting υ = 0 in Theorem 4.1.
b) It follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that υ > 0 implies (1− υ) (2− 1
pi
)
>
2(1− υ)− 1
pi
for all pi ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we model three different online betting markets: those given
by fixed-odds, spread bets, and parimutuel, respectively. This allows us
to analyse the effect of two different tax schemes: On volume (GBD) and
on profit (GPT). In both fixed-odds and spread bets, respectively odds and
commission are unaffected by GPT but they are by GBD. Hence, it should be
expected that odds and commission to depend on the particular regulation.
For example, Paddy Power Betfair, which includes one of the largest Internet
spread betting companies, charges a different commission for spread bets
on each country. This commission is 5% in the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Italy, Gibraltar and Malta; 7% in Albany, Armenia, Croatia, Monaco, Serbia,
Montenegro and Slovakia; and 6.5% in the rest of the countries, including
Spain. Moreover, the company is restricted in Belgium, Greece, Germany6,
Turkey, Israel, France and Portugal, among other countries.
As opposed to other approaches in the literature, we do not assume the
existence of an actual probability for the home (or away) team to win the
match. Instead, the bettors are characterized by their subjective beliefs on
this probability. An alternative interpretation is that each bettor is char-
acterized by the the odd at which she is willing to bet, which includes the
individual surplus of the act of betting itself. In this sense, a natural ex-
tension of the model, which does not change the results, is to assume that
there are two subsets of bettors: one of them willing to bet for the home
team, another willing to bet for the away team, and both characterized by
the minimum odd they will bet.
6Betfair is only restricted in Germany for spread bets.
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